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Abstract: A dramatic rise in the nonmedical of pharmaceutical opioids has presented the United 
States with a substantial public health problem. Nonmedical use of prescription pain relievers has 
become increasingly prevalent in the US over the last two decades, and diversion of medicines 
obtained by prescription is assumed to be a major source of supply for nonmedical opioid use. 
Policymakers striving to protect population health by ameliorating the adverse outcomes of 
nonmedical use of opioid analgesics could benefit from a systems-level model which reflects the 
complexity of the system and incorporates the full range of available data. To address this need, 
the current project describes the conceptualization and development of a System Dynamics 
model that is used to complement and leverage results from existing research. Additional testing 
is needed to authenticate preliminary intervention simulation results, which suggest that a 
reduction in the initiation of nonmedical use may have a more profound impact on the total 
number of opioid overdose deaths than more tamper-resistant formulations, decreases in opioid 
prescribing, or decreases in rates of abuse among medical users. Results indicate that System 
Dynamics can help to identify points of high leverage for policy interventions as well as bring 
attention to the unanticipated negative consequences of these interventions. 
  
Introduction 
A dramatic rise in the nonmedical use of pharmaceutical opioids has presented the United 
States with a substantial public health problem (Comptom & Volkow, 2006). Results from the 
National Survey of Drug Use and Health suggest that in 2009, 5.3 million individuals (2.1% of 
the U.S. population age 12 and up) had used pharmaceutical opioids for nonmedical purposes 
within the past month (SAMHSA, 2010a). Trend data suggest that nonmedical use is becoming 
increasingly severe and remains largely unabated by current policies and regulations (e.g., 
Fishman et al., 2004). Tools and interventions are sorely needed to reduce nonmedical use of 
opioids, and practitioners are in need of efficacious strategies to detect, prevent, and treat the 
nonmedical use of opioid medications (Compton & Volkow, 2006). This article describes a 
system dynamics model which is designed to inform efforts to intervene in the epidemic of 
nonmedical pharmaceutical opioid use by identifying points of high-leverage in the system of 
nonmedical pharmaceutical opioid consumption in the United States.  
Background 
Nonmedical use of prescription pain relievers has become increasingly popular in the 
United States over the last two decades. Pharmaceutical opioids are now among the most popular 
drugs for nonmedical use in the United States, second only to marijuana (NCASA, 2005). The 
rate of initiation has increased drastically from the early 90s through the early 2000s (SAMHSA, 
2006), with 2.2 million individuals initiating the nonmedical use of pain relievers in 2008 
(SAMHSA, 2009a). The rate of opioid-related overdose has also been escalating in the United 
States, with more than a threefold increase between 1999 and 2006, and more than a fivefold 
increase among youth aged 15-24 (Warner et al., 2009). Overdose deaths due to pharmaceutical 
opioids have outnumbered deaths due to both cocaine and heroin since 2001, and in 2007 
outnumbered heroin by more than five times (CDC, 2010).  
The diversion of pharmaceutical opioids is assumed to be a major source of supply for 
nonmedical use. Results from the 2009 National Survey on Drug Use and Health (SAMHSA, 
2010) demonstrate that friends or relatives commonly reported as the source of the pain reliever 
used nonmedically most recently. Fifty-five percent of respondents said they obtained the pain 
reliever they nonmedically used most recently from a friend or relative for free, and another 
14.9% said they either purchased or stole them from a friend or relative. Among survey 
respondents who received the drugs for free, 80% of them also reported that their friend or 
relative had originally received the drugs from a doctor, although the survey didn’t ask whether 
the source’s relationship with that doctor was a legitimate one. These results suggest that the 
largest source of pharmaceutical opioids for nonmedical use is the reservoir found in the home 
medicine cabinet kept by patients and others.  
Recent increases in the prescribing of pharmaceutical opioids stems in part from recent 
surges in the diagnosis of and recognition of the need to treat chronic noncancer pain. A 
longitudinal analysis of chronic pain prevalence at a primary care facility in Seattle, Washington 
suggested that 11.2% of primary care patients who were previously free from chronic pain 
(defined as pain symptoms lasting 6 months or longer) were found to suffer from chronic pain 
during the year of the study (Gureje et al., 2001). Data from NHANES (Hardt et al., 2008), 
coupled with data from the U.S. Census Bureau, support an estimated prevalence of 29 million 
Americans aged 20 or older with chronic pain (defined as pain lasting three months or longer) in 
the period 1999-2002, indicating that pain is a significant cause of disability (National Center for 
Health Statistics, 2006).  The increased rate of diagnosis of chronic pain has increased the 
demand for medical treatment. And while opioid treatment for chronic, noncancer pain is 
considered by some to be controversial (Collett, 2001), pharmaceutical opioids have been found 
to be more effective at ameliorating pain than alternative medications (see Furlan et al., 2006 for 
a review), and their prescription and medical use has become increasingly common over the last 
decade (Governale, 2007, 2008a, 2008b).  
It is not entirely understood why pharmaceutical opioids have become so popular for 
nonmedical use, especially relative to other licit and illicit substances.  Users may feel a false 
sense of safety when using these products because, unlike illicit drugs, they are a medication that 
is endorsed and frequently prescribed by physicians (Compton & Volkow, 2006). In addition, the 
surge in chronic pain treatment may provide non-patients with access to pharmaceutical opioids 
through friends or relatives, and may also provide many youth with role models who are taking 
pain medication in the context of everyday activities (Compton & Volkow, 2006).  
As of February 2009, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has begun requiring Risk 
Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS) for all Schedule II long-acting pharmaceutical 
opioids as a way to ensure that the benefits of these medications outweigh their risks (Leiderman, 
2009). REMS requirements vary for each opioid product, depending on the level of risk, but all 
REMS must include an evaluation of their effectiveness and may additionally require specific 
interventions, including: (a) a medication guide, (b) a patient package insert, (c) a 
communication plan, (d) other “elements to assure safe use,” and (e) an implementation system. 
Unfortunately, prior research has found little evidence to suggest that these types of interventions 
are effective in reducing the risk of medication misuse or abuse (see Chou et al., 2009 for a 
systematic review). There remains a need for tools and interventions that effectively reduce the 
adverse outcomes associated with the misuse of pharmaceutical opioids.  
System Dynamics 
The system dynamics (SD) modeling approach uses a set of differential equations to 
simulate system behavior over time. Such models are well suited to health policy analysis 
involving complex chains of influence and feedback loops which are beyond the capabilities of 
statistical models (Sterman, 2006), and have been successfully applied to the evaluation of policy 
alternatives for a variety of public health problems, such as for cocaine abuse prevention 
(Homer, 1993), health care reform (Milstein, Homer, & Hirsch, 2010), diabetes population 
dynamics (Jones et al., 2006), and tobacco policy options (Cavana & Tobias, 2008).   
The SD approach can help to identify points of high-leverage for policy interventions as 
well as unanticipated negative consequences of these interventions, providing policymakers with 
information that is not available through research that is focused on individual aspects of a 
system (Sterman, 2006). In the current project, the development of an SD model complements 
and leverages results from an extensive amount of research based on surveys and statistical 
analyses, such as Fleming et al. (2007) who identify factors associated with opioid abuse, Butler 
et al. (2010) who use factor analysis to identify the aspects of opioid product formulations that 
are related to attractiveness for abuse, and Davis and Johnson (2007) who report on opioid use, 
abuse & diversion, concluding with a call for models to be developed.  
Policymakers striving to protect population health by ameliorating the adverse outcomes 
of nonmedical opioid use could benefit from a systems-level model of pharmaceutical opioid 
medical and nonmedical use which reflects the complexity of the system and incorporates the 
full range of available data. This article describes a SD model designed to increase understanding 
of the system of pharmaceutical opioid nonmedical use and to help identify and assess leverage 
points for reducing the associated adverse outcomes. The following sections describe the 
conceptual approach and research method employed and outlines how the model represents the 
fundamental dynamics of pharmaceutical opioids as they are prescribed, diverted, used 
nonmedically, and involved in overdose morbidity and mortality. Model testing is then discussed 
briefly, followed by a description of several simulated interventions and their effectiveness in 
reducing the adverse outcomes and population risk in the model. The discussion section 
highlights the main contributions of the model findings, future directions for continued research 
in this area, and the likely implications of the study’s preliminary findings. 
Model Creation Process 
The model creation process began in May, 2009, with a core modeling team and a panel 
of leading experts in various related fields. The core modeling team included Lewis Lee, M.S., 
Louis Macovsky, D.V.M., M.S., and Wayne Wakeland, Ph.D., and was joined by Teresa 
Schmidt, M.A., as of January, 2010. Advisory panel members included leading authorities on the 
use of pharmaceutical opioids to treat chronic pain, prescription drug diversion and addiction, 
health policy analysis, and SD modeling (see Table 1). Purdue Pharma L.P., which markets some 
pharmaceutical opioids, provided the funding and support necessary for the team to 
independently develop an epidemiological model of pharmaceutical opioid use, diversion, and 
nonmedical use. 
Table 1. Advisory Panel Members 
John Fitzgerald, Ph.D., L.P.C., C.A.S., Associate Director, Risk Management & Epidemiology, 
Purdue Pharma L. P. 
Aaron Gilson, M.S., M.S.S.W., Ph.D., Director of the Pain & Policy Studies Group at the 
University of Wisconsin Carbone Comprehensive Center. 
J. David Haddox, D.D.S., M.D., D.A.B.P.M., Vice President of Health Policy for Purdue 
Pharma L.P. 
Dennis McCarty, M.A., Ph.D., professor and Vice Chair in the Department of Public Health & 
Preventive Medicine at Oregon Health and Science University 
Lynn Webster, M.D., F.A.C.P.M., F.A.S.A.M., cofounder and Chief Medical Director of the 
Lifetree Clinical Research and Pain Clinic 
Jack Homer, M.S., Ph.D., a nationally renowned expert in the application of system dynamics 
to public health policy evaluation 
Model development began with a thorough review of existing literature so that empirical 
evidence could be found to support key model parameters. Literature sources included a broad 
spectrum of data sources, survey results, and scholarly articles covering the period from 1995 to 
2007. The advisory panel met with the modeling team on several occasions in 2009 (May, July, 
August, and December) and 2010 (February and June) to oversee the model logic and the 
representation of parameters and interventions in the model.  
In the early meetings, panel members discussed areas of particular importance to the 
pharmaceutical opioid nonmedical use epidemic and shared professional presentations on these 
areas. Key topics included chronic pain treatment, diversion, dependence and abuse, and the 
FDA REMS. The modeling team drew from panel members’ discussions and presentations to 
shape the initial model structure and to define the boundaries of inclusion. Starting in August, 
2009, the modeling team shared drafts of the model with panelists, along with overview 
presentations that summarized how the model logic had been developed and informed.  The 
panel was invited to critique the model and was presented with dilemmas regarding the most 
accurate way to represent various aspects of treatment, diversion, and nonmedical use. During 
these meetings, panel members referred the modeling team to additional resources and drew 
from their professional knowledge to inform the team’s design of the model.  
Multiple data gaps were identified that could not be adequately addressed by existing 
literature (see Wakeland et al., 2010). In these cases, panel members provided their expert 
judgment to help fill these data gaps, and rigorous model testing was used to determine whether 
the model’s performance was contingent upon the accuracy of these data. In May 2010, the 
model was reviewed by Homer, who carefully evaluated the model logic and provided a detailed 
critique to Lee and Wakeland. Model logic and parameters were refined according to Homer’s 
critiques and were then reviewed by the expert panel in June, 2010. Over the subsequent months, 
the model was subjected to rigorous testing to identify it strengths and weaknesses.  
In August, 2010, model testing revealed the need for a fundamental change in model 
logic. Up until that point, the model had been built under the implicit assumption that the 
epidemic of nonmedical use was essentially driven by increases in opioid prescribing. But model 
testing revealed that increases in prescribing and sharing simply could not account for the full 
magnitude of the epidemic. Although sharing and other forms of diversion are necessary to fuel 
the epidemic, model testing results indicated that the upsurge in nonmedical use must have been 
driven at least in part by increased popularity and demand for opioid products in the nonmedical 
use (NMU) sector. This insight led to substantial revision of the model, including additional 
consultation with the expert panel and revisions to much of the model logic.  
Dynamics of the Pharmaceutical Opioid Epidemic 
The following sections describe major areas of the system dynamics model. The model 
encompasses the dynamics of medical treatment with opioid analgesics, the initiation and 
prevalence of nonmedical usage, drug supply and demand, and opioid-related overdose fatalities. 
Three major sections of the model are discussed, each of which includes a description of 
empirical support, a narrative description of the model’s behavior, and a causal loop diagram to 
illustrate the structure and logic. The verbal descriptions contain parenthetical numbers that 
correspond to specific points along the feedback loops in the diagrams. The model contains 8 
state variables and their associated differential equations, 62 auxiliary variables and their 
associated algebraic equations or graphical functions, and 57 parameters.  
Nonmedical Use of Pharmaceutical Opioids 
Empirical findings in the literature support key model parameters and help to clarify the 
model’s logic and many of its assumptions. Within the ‘Nonmedical Use Sector,’ DSM-IV 
criteria have been used to differentiate persons who engage in problematic substance use 
according to whether or not they meet diagnostic criteria for “opioid abuse” or “opioid 
dependence” (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). NSDUH data from the year 2000 to 
2004 suggests that around 12-14% of individuals who use pharmaceutical opioids nonmedically 
meet the criteria for abuse or dependence (Colliver, Kroutil, Dai & Gfroerer, 2006), either of 
which is associated with a significantly higher frequency of nonmedical use. Specifically, 
analyses of NSDUH 2007 data by Lee in 2010 (Lee et al., 2010) indicate that high frequency 
nonmedical users (who meet the DSM-IV criteria for dependence or abuse) use opioids around 
220 days per year, whereas low frequency nonmedical users do so about 30 days per year. 
Extrapolation from heroin findings indicates that higher frequency of opioid use is associated 
with a significantly higher all-cause mortality rate (WHO; see Degenhardt et al., 2004; and Hser 
et al., 2001). This information was interpreted to indicate that low and high frequency users 
constitute two separate populations in the nonmedical use sector. 
The supply of pharmaceutical opioids for nonmedical use often comes from friends or 
relatives, but can also come from leftover medicine obtained by prescription, prescription 
forgery, ‘doctor shopping’ (visiting multiple doctors for the purpose of obtaining the same or 
similar drugs ), theft, or drug dealers (SAMHSA, 2007). Drug trafficking, theft, and forgery 
among non-patients are not included in the current model, as they would add considerable 
complexity to model logic and do not relate directly to the dynamics of chronic pain treatment,  
diversion from patients, and nonmedical use. Extrapolation of results from the 2006 NSDUH 
survey (SAMHSA, 2007) suggests around 25% of the nonmedical demand for pharmaceutical 
opioids is ‘trafficked,’ or bought or stolen from patients with pain conditions who are receiving 
these products ostensibly for treatment. The empirical evidence described above, as well as other 
findings (see Appendix A), informs the model logic in the nonmedical sector. This logic and 
many of its underlying assumptions are described with the following narrative and are illustrated 
in Figure 1. In the current model, a percentage of the U.S. population {1} is assumed to initiate 
nonmedical use each year {2}, all of whom start out in a stock (i.e., population) of ‘Low 
Frequency Nonmedical Users’ and a small percentage of whom advance to a stock of ‘High 
Frequency Nonmedical Users’ {3} during each subsequent year. The total number of individuals 
using opioids nonmedically {4} is divided by the current number of individuals in the US who 
are using other drugs nonmedically {5} to calculate the relative popularity of pharmaceutical 
opioids for nonmedical use {6}. As the popularity of using pharmaceutical opioids for 
nonmedical use increases, the rate of initiation increases, creating a positive feedback loop that 
results in exponential increases in the rate of initiation. 
Demand for pharmaceutical opioids is calculated from the number of individuals in low- 
and high-frequency populations {7}. Much of this demand is assumed to be met through illicit 
channels (e.g., theft, forgery, or interpersonal sharing), but about 25% of it is assumed to depend 
on diversion from chronic pain patients {8}. When this 25% represents an ample amount 
compared to demand, the rate of initiation {2} is assumed to be unaffected, as well as the rate of 
advancement from low frequency to high frequency use {3}. However, when the [trafficking-
related] supply is limited, rates of initiation and advancement are assumed to decrease. The 
number of dosage units diverted from patients divided by the U.S. population, indicates the 
degree to which opioids are accessible for nonmedical use {9}. As the populations of nonmedical 
users increase beyond what the patient-diverted supply can support, accessibility becomes 
limited, decreasing initiation and advancement, and creating a negative feedback loop that 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Medical Use of Pharmaceutical Opioids 
An overview of some key empirical findings helps to clarify the logic and assumptions of 
the ‘Medical Use Sector’ as well. Historically, increases in opioid abuse, defined as the self-
administered use of a pharmaceutical opioid medication for a nonmedical purpose (Katz et al., 
2010), and increases in addiction, which involves uncontrollable compulsions and significant 
adverse consequences (Compton, Darakjian, & Miotto, 1998), have led to the implementation of 
regulatory policies for pharmaceutical opioids (FDA, 2008). These regulatory policies have been 
shown to lead many physicians to avoid prescribing opioids to patients out of fear of overzealous 
regulatory scrutiny (Joranson, Gilson, Dahl, & Haddox, 2002). In addition, prescribers who are 
fearful of regulatory scrutiny of their opioid analgesic prescribing practices have been found to 
decrease the amount of opioids they prescribe, limiting quantities and refills, and to shift 
prescribing to opioid products with a presumably lower risk of abuse, addiction, or overdose 
(i.e., products in less-restrictive schedules under the federal Controlled Substances Act; Wolfert, 
Gilson, Dahl, & Cleary, 2010).    
 Regarding the relative risks of different opioid products, immediate-release, short-acting 
formulations (single-entity and opioid + non-opioid combination analgesics) are prescribed much 
more frequently and are, therefore, implicated in a larger number of overdose deaths (Cicero, 
Surratt, Inciardi, & Munoz, 2007).  Another way of evaluating relative risk, however, is to use 
the number of persons exposed via prescription, as opposed to the population as a whole.  The 
latter denominator estimates the general overall health burden of a particular drug-associated 
problem, while the former provides a metric whereby the harm is normalized on the basis of 
exposure, since not all persons in a given location will be exposed to a pharmaceutical opioid 
analgesic and exposure rates can vary by geographic location and over time. When abuse rates 
are normalized for the number of individuals exposed via out-patient, retail dispensing of these 
drugs, a metric referred to as Unique Recipients of Dispensed Drug (URDD), long-acting opioids 
(products that are pharmacologically long-acting, such as methadone, and those which are 
pharmaceutically-designed to be long-acting, such as transdermal delivery systems and 
modified-release oral opioid analgesic formulations) have a higher rate of abuse per 1000 URDD 
than do the immediate-release opioid analgesics. For example, from 2003 to 2006, 5-8 cases of 
long-acting opioid abuse were found per 1,000 URDD, compared to <1 case of abuse per 1,000 
URDD for short-acting opioids (Cicero et al., 2007). Support materials for a recent FDA 
meeting, using numbers of prescriptions, as distinct from numbers of URDD, included an 
analysis of emergency department (ED) data which showed that “the rate of ED visits per 10,000 
prescriptions was about five times higher for OxyContin [a long-acting formulation] compared to 
oxycodone [a short-acting formulation] over a recent three-year period” (FDA, 2010). Physicians 
have been found to be sensitive to this information regarding relative risk, and exhibit more 
caution in prescribing long-acting opioids (Potter et al., 2001).  
The empirical evidence described above, as well as other findings (see Appendix B) 
informs the model logic in the medical sector. This logic and its underlying assumptions are 
described with the following narrative and are illustrated in Figure 2.  In the current model, a 
proportion of the U.S. population is diagnosed with a chronic pain condition each year {1}. 
Patients are subsequently treated with either short-acting {2} or long-acting {3} opioid 
formulations, and become members of one of the stocks (populations) of chronic pain patients 
under treatment. Patients who begin treatment with short-acting formulations may cease 
treatment if their condition improves, or they may switch to long-acting formulations if their pain 
conditions worsen {4}.  
Each year a portion of patients in both the short-acting and long-acting populations begin 
to abuse and/or become addicted to the prescribed opioids, causing their membership to transfer 
to either the stock of long-acting patients with opioid abuse or addiction {5} or the stock of 
short-acting patients with opioid abuse or addiction {6}. Note that this stock {6} does not 
include people who initiate nonmedical use of opioids without having been prescribed opioids, 
and, therefore, the people in this stock are also considered to be another category of opioid user.  
The fraction of patients with abuse or addiction{7} influences physicians’ perception of the risk 
involved in prescribing opioids {8}, as does the total number of opioid overdose deaths each 
year {9}. As physicians perceive higher levels of risk {8} they become increasingly biased 
toward prescribing short-acting (lower risk) formulations {10}, and their overall rates of opioid 
prescribing decrease {11}. Because of these balancing feedback loops, increases in the amount 
of abuse and addiction {7} is slowed when physicians begin to perceive higher levels of risk. 
Thus, the model variables move towards a state of dynamic equilibrium, stabilized by 
physicians’ response to increasing rates of abuse, addiction, and overdose.  
 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Diversion of Pharmaceutical Opioids 
An overview of some key empirical findings helps clarify the model’s logic and 
assumptions regarding the diversion of pharmaceutical opioids to nonmedical use via chronic 
pain patients. Within the ‘Diversion Sector,’ results from the 2009 National Survey on Drug Use 
and Health (SAMHSA, 2010) indicate that among individuals who reported using pain relievers 
nonmedically in the past year, 17.6% of them stated that they acquired their most recent supply 
through a prescription from a doctor, indicating that they may have been a patient (medical user). 
Among non-patient, nonmedical users who have not received a prescription, about 6% acquired 
their most recent supply through theft or forgery, and 69% received opioids for free from friends 
or family members, the majority of whom did receive prescriptions directly from a doctor, 
although the survey does not gather information on the nature of the relationship between the 
source and the doctor (legitimate therapeutic relationship, doctor being deceived, doctor 
cooperating with source). Based on this information, the current model assumes that the 
remaining 25% of the demand generated by low and high frequency users is met through buying 
or stealing it from chronic pain patients (trafficking, as opposed to sharing).  
Research suggests that around 5% of chronic pain patients engage in doctor shopping and 
around 4% engage in forgery (Manchikanti et al., 2006). In the current model, forgery and doctor 
shopping are assumed to be exhibited entirely by patients with abuse or addiction. Stocks of 
patients with abuse or addiction constitute around 10% of the total population of chronic pain 
patients, so 40% of these patients are assumed to exhibit forgery, and 50% of these patients are 
assumed to exhibit doctor shopping. The proportion of additional prescriptions that are 
successfully acquired through these methods remains unknown, but is assumed in the model to 
be 12% and 14% for doctor shopping and forgery, respectively. 
The empirical evidence described above, as well as other findings (see Appendix C) 
informs the model logic in the diversion sector. This logic and its underlying assumptions are 
described with the following narrative and are illustrated in Figure 3. A fixed proportion of the 
patients with abuse or addiction are assumed to engage in trafficking each year, including doctor 
shopping {1} and forgery {2}. The number of extra prescriptions acquired {3} is calculated as a 
product of (a) the average number of prescriptions given to patients with abuse or addiction, (b) 
the number of patients who engaging in trafficking, and (c) the fraction of excess prescriptions 
acquired through forgery and doctor shopping. Some proportion of these excess prescriptions is 
assumed to be used by the patients themselves, rather than diverted to non-patient users {4}. This 
number is calculated as a product of (a) the number of patients with abuse or addiction and (b) 
the average number of extra prescriptions used per year by each patient with abuse or addiction. 
The number of prescriptions that are used “in excess” by pain patients is subtracted from the 
number of extra prescriptions acquired, and the rest is converted to dosage units {5} and 
assumed to be diverted to nonmedical users through trafficking channels {6}. 
Diverted pharmaceutical opioids accumulate in a stock of dosage units {7} that are 
consumed according to the demand in the Nonmedical Use Sector not met by sharing, forgery, or 
stealing. Supply can also be expressed as ‘months of supply available’ {8}, which indicates the 
extent to which the diverted supply is able to meet the demand at any given time. When the 
supply of opioids becomes limited, a profit motive emerges {9} and patients’ motivation for 
prescription forgery and doctor shopping increases. As this motivation fluctuates, the fraction of 
prescriptions acquired through forgery and doctor shopping follows {10}, effectively stabilizing 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The model was tested in detail to determine its robustness and to gain an overall sense of 
its validity. As is often the case with system dynamics models, the empirical support for some of 
the parameters was limited. (See Appendices for key support references.) System Dynamics 
models are generally more credible when their behavior is not highly sensitive to changes in the 
parameters that have limited empirical support. Therefore, to determine sensitivity of primary 
outcomes to changes in parameter values, each parameter in turn was increased by 30% and then 
decreased by 30%, and the outcome was recorded in terms of cumulative overdose deaths. 
Several parameters with limited empirical support did have a substantial influence on model 
behavior, meaning a 30% change in the parameter resulted in a greater than 30% change in the 
cumulative number of overdose deaths of the number of patients treated for pain with long-acting 
opioids.   
Parameters that were both sensitive and empirically limited included the impact of 
perceived risk on prescribing behavior, the percentage of diagnosed chronic pain patients who 
are treated with opioids, the average number of dosage units taken per day of nonmedical usage, 
the impact of a limited nonmedical supply on forgery and doctor shopping behavior, and the 
impact of three intervention alternatives (discussed in more detail below), including (a) increased 
perceived risk on the part of physicians, (b) increased tamper resistance of opioid formulations, 
and (c) decreased popularity of pharmaceutical opioids for nonmedical use. (See Wakeland et al., 
2010 for more information regarding data gaps.) Some of the parameters that strongly influenced 
model behavior did have sufficient empirical support, such as baseline rates of opioid 
abuse/addiction, the average number of prescriptions given to chronic pain patients, the average 
number of dosage units per prescription, and overdose mortality rates. However, because model 
testing revealed a high degree of sensitivity to parameters for which empirical support is limited, 
study results must be considered preliminary and exploratory.  
In addition to sensitivity analyses, the model was also tested to ensure that its behavior 
remained plausible when subjected to tests involving extreme conditions (i.e., abnormal 
parameter values), and model results were compared to historical reference data, where 
available. The results of these tests were generally favorable, which indicated to us at least a 
preliminary degree of model validity.  
Simulated Interventions  
To illustrate the potential for evaluating interventions, several areas in the model were 
identified as likely to exhibit high-leverage. Several possible interventions were added to the 
simulation to explore their potential effects on the number of opioid overdose deaths in the U.S. 
population. All interventions were represented as simple toggles that would double beneficial 
parameters or halve harmful parameters in the model. While somewhat unrealistic, these 
dramatic interventions help to illustrate the dynamics of the model and the system’s response to 
interventions at each point of leverage. 
Tamper resistance intervention. This intervention tested the introduction of new, highly 
effective tamper-resistant formulations for long-acting pharmaceutical opioids. In the model, this 
was simulated by increasing the tamper resistance by a factor of two, which caused two proximal 
effects in the medical sector: a) the rate at which opioid-treated chronic pain patients become 
abusers or addicts was reduced by 50%, and b) physicians perceived there to be much less risk of 
abuse and therefore prescribed opioid therapy for a higher fraction of their patients, including 
more prescribing of tamper-resistant long-acting formulations. Tamper resistance also reduced 
the rate of nonmedical use initiation by 50% in the nonmedical sector. 
 Prescriber intervention. This intervention simulated the possible outcome of a highly 
effective prescriber education program by doubling physicians’ perception of risk and therefore 
reducing rates of treatment with opioids. This intervention reduced the percentage of patients 
who develop abuse or addiction because the interventions assumed that educated prescribers 
would be much more selective in the use of opioid treatment and would monitor treatment more 
effectively. In the model, when physicians’ perception of risk doubles, the fraction of patients 
treated is decreased by 50%, and the fraction of patients developing abuse or addiction is 
decreased by 50%.   
Patient intervention. This intervention simulated a reduction in the rate at which patients 
develop abuse or addiction but maintained the baseline level of physician risk perception. The 
fraction of patients developing abuse/addiction was decreased by 50%, similar to the prescriber 
intervention. However, this third intervention isolated the effects of patient behavior from the 
behavior of prescribers, so the results could be interpreted separately.  
Popularity intervention. This intervention simulated a reduction in the popularity of 
pharmaceutical opioids for nonmedical use, which is calculated as the total number of 
individuals using pharmaceutical opioids divided by the total number of individuals using other 
illicit substances in the U.S. When this ratio is halved, it effectively reduces the rate of initiation 
by 50%.  
Results 
Figure 4 shows a baseline model run for the historical period from 1995 to 2008, plus a 
policy evaluation period from 2008 to 2015. Reference data is scant, but total opioid-related 
deaths, resulting from all types of medical and nonmedical use, was reported to be 13, 755 in 
2006, and historical data suggests the pattern of increase has been almost exponential, increasing 
more gradually in the late 90s and more rapidly throughout the early 2000s (Warner, Chen & 
Makuc, 2009).  
 
Figure 4. Baseline calculated opioid-related deaths 
As shown in Figure 4, the model’s baseline behavior exhibits a nearly exponential shape 
between the late 90s and early 2000s, and calculates a total number of opioid overdose deaths to 
be around 13,400 in 2006, with 2,823 overdose deaths among medical users and 10,580 overdose 
deaths among nonmedical users. So these baseline results can be considered plausible, but 
additional support is needed to know how accurately the model reproduces the proportion of 
overdose deaths suffered by medical and nonmedical users. The fraction of deaths associated 
with only medical or nonmedical use is not known, and must be estimated. One study of opioid 
overdose deaths found that less than half of the decedents had ever been prescribed opioids (Hall 
et al., 2008), suggesting that medical users probably account for much less than half of the 
overdose deaths. This rough estimate is captured by the model’s baseline behavior, but additional 
validation of the proportion of opioid overdose deaths attributable to medical users is needed.  
Even with limited reference data, the current model illustrates the potential usefulness of 
SD model for policy analysis. The model was configured to show the response to the four 
interventions described in the methods section. All four interventions were modeled as having a 
very high degree of effectiveness in order to exaggerate their impacts; and for each case, the 
simulated intervention began in 2008 and persisted until the end of the simulation, 2015.  
 
Figure 5. Effect of simulated interventions (tamper resistance, prescriber, patient, and popularity) 
in 2008 on opioid-related overdose deaths 
Tamper Resistance Intervention 
Figure 5 shows the number of opioid overdose deaths per year among chronic pain 
patients, including the historical period from 1995 to 2008, plus the policy evaluation period 
from 2008 to 2012. As might be expected, doubling the degree to which tamper resistance 
prevents abuse has an impact on the number of nonmedical users who suffer overdose deaths. 
Interestingly, increased tamper resistance also leads to an increase in the number of patients who 
die of overdose. This is because, as shown in Figure 6, the prescribers’ perception of the risk of 
these medicines drops sharply, which significantly increases the total number of patients who 
received opioid therapy. So although tamper resistance leads to a smaller percentage of patients 
dying, its implementation causes the percentage of individuals receiving opioids to increase by 
an even greater percentage.  
 
Prescriber and Patient Interventions 
The tamper resistance intervention influences both the perception of risk and the death 
fraction, and these effects are somewhat confounding. To isolate perceived risk from the total 
number of opioid overdose deaths, two additional simulations were implemented in the medical 
sector. The prescriber intervention, as shown in Figure 5, leads to an immediate increase in 
perceived risk that reduced rates of opioid treatment and leads to an immediate reduction in the 
annual number of medical overdose deaths. The reduction in total patients eventually leads to a 
reduced supply of diverted opioids and reduces the number of nonmedical users who die of 
overdose. Unfortunately, this delay takes several decades to effectively reduce nonmedical 
overdose deaths, and much of the nonmedical supply is acquired outside of diversion from 
chronic pain patients, so the number of nonmedical overdose deaths stabilizes at around 14,000 
by the year 2025. 
The patient intervention simply reduces the abuse/addiction rate of chronic pain patients 
by 50% without directly influencing prescriber risk. As shown in Figure 5, this reduces the 
steepness of the slope of medical overdose deaths, but they still increase gradually through 2015 
(and stabilize at around 3850 deaths per year by 2030). The effect of this patient intervention on 
the number of overdose deaths in the nonmedical sector is negligible.  
Popularity Intervention 
Lastly, the popularity intervention decreases the popularity of pharmaceutical opioids for 
nonmedical use (and subsequently the initiation rate) by 50%. As might be expected, this does 
not have an impact on the number of chronic pain patients who suffer from overdose deaths, but 
it has a dramatic effect on the number of nonmedical users who do. By the year 2025, 
nonmedical overdose deaths are calculated to reach the level of medical overdose deaths, at 
around 4,200 deaths per year. Because a larger proportion of the overdose deaths are attributed to 
nonmedical users, these results indicate that the rate of initiation is a more powerful leverage 
point for reducing the total number of opioid overdose deaths than the rate of abuse/addiction 
among chronic pain patients. 
Discussion 
The preliminary results from the model indicate that system dynamic modeling has 
promise as a tool for understanding the epidemic of nonmedical use of pharmaceutical opioids. It 
holds promise for contributing to the evaluation of policy options and could be used to address 
opioid-related mortality and morbidity. More specifically, the results of the prescriber and patient 
interventions suggest that changes in the number of patients who are prescribed opioids have a 
greater impact on the total number of medical overdose deaths than changes in the fraction of 
patients who develop abuse or addiction. So long as tamper-resistant formulations cannot offer 
perfect protection against overdose deaths, this may be a valid concern for the implementation of 
tamper-resistant formulations into the pharmaceutical market.  However, tamper-resistant 
formulations may have other public health benefits, such as reduced transmission of infectious 
diseases by injection drug use (eg, HIV/AIDS, hepatitis B and C), thromboembolic events from 
injection of tablet particulates, abscesses, and septicemia.  This model did not attempt to estimate 
such other public health benefits. 
In addition, previous research has indicated that over half of opioid overdose deaths are 
suffered by individuals who have never been prescribed pharmaceutical opioids directly (Hall et 
al., 2008). The preliminary results of the model indicate that reducing the initiation of 
nonmedical use is indeed a more powerful point of leverage than reducing the number of chronic 
pain patients who develop addiction or abuse. Furthermore, results from NSDUH 2006 data 
(SAMHSA, 2007) indicate that a substantial fraction of the opioids that are used among 
nonmedical populations are acquired through sources outside of diversion from patients. Results 
from the simulated prescriber intervention suggest that the impact of efforts to reduce overdose 
deaths among non-patient populations may take a long time to manifest. 
 A key strength of this study is its system-level perspective and deliberate recognition of 
the complex interconnections and feedback loops associated with pharmaceutical opioid 
consumption and the adverse outcomes that are associated with it. Although the current model 
has not yet been sufficiently calibrated to predict the absolute impact of the four simulated 
interventions, the present study serves well to demonstrate how a systems-level model may help 
to evaluate the potential efficacy of interventions to reduce opioid-related overdose deaths. The 
model demonstrates a comparison of the relative impacts of three alternative interventions, and 
illuminates the complex interactions associated with pharmaceutical treatment of chronic pain, 
the risk of abuse and addiction, prescriber perceptions, diversion, and adverse outcomes such as 
overdose mortality. From a systems perspective, it is likely that highly effective tamper-resistant 
opioid formulations could significantly reduce the fraction of medical users who die from 
accidental overdose, but it may be less likely that the total number of overdose deaths among 
medical users would be reduced. And while prescriber and patient interventions have the 
potential for reducing the number of medical overdose deaths, they are likely to be less effective 
in reducing the total number of opioid-related overdose deaths when compared to interventions 
that reduce the rate of initiation of nonmedical use among non-patient populations. 
Limitations 
Despite great efforts to find empirical support for all model parameters, validity remains 
a primary limitation in the current study. Several parameters have weak empirical support, as 
mentioned previously, and a number of potentially important factors have been excluded, often 
because support remains elusive. For example, the model is limited in that it focuses exclusively 
on prescribing and diversion of pharmaceutical opioids for the treatment of chronic pain, without 
representing acute pain patients and their treatment with pharmaceutical opioids. The nonmedical 
use sector is designed to capture the overall demand for and nonmedical use of all types of 
pharmaceutical opioids and the associated adverse consequences. The prescribing of opioids to 
treat acute pain accounts for a significant fraction of the opioids dispensed annually, so it is 
likely to contribute the supply of opioids for the nonmedical use sector, as well as to physician’s 
perception of risk in the medical use sector. For both of these reasons, the exclusion of acute pain 
treatment may threaten the validity of the model. A closely related limitation in the medical 
sector is that all “new” chronic pain patients in the model are considered to have legitimate 
medical need for analgesics, when in reality some of the people presenting with purported pain 
are motivated by illicit intent (see Weaver & Schnoll, 2007). 
Beyond the limited representation of variations in opioid treatment, the model also does 
not account for either poly-drug use or poly-drug abuse, either of which may involve other 
opioids or non-opioids with additive effects in the central nervous system (eg, benzodiazepines, 
cocaine, heroin), both of which dramatically increase the risk of unintentional overdose, nor does 
the model account for the tendency for drug abusers to switch between or to combine 
pharmaceutical opioids and other drugs, both pharmaceutical and illicit, due to supply, cost, and 
other factors. The model excludes the influence of opioid addiction treatment programs and 
common non-pharmacologic alternatives to using opioids for chronic pain treatment, such as 
cognitive behavioral therapy (Morley, Williams, & Hussain, 2008). And institutional factors that 
impact opioid use, such as payor policies and formularies, as well as cost constraints, are also 
excluded from the model at this time. Because poly-drug use and abuse, opioid treatment 
programs, alternative treatments, and institutional factors can all influence rates of both the 
medical and nonmedical use of opioids and the negative outcomes associated with such use, the 
exclusion of these many factors imposes limitations on the model’s ability to provide conclusive 
inferences.  
Work is underway to expand the scope of the model to address many of the above 
limitations. Still, it is hoped that the insights achieved by applying a system dynamics approach 
to this important public health concern can inform policy makers about the value of system 
dynamics for analyzing alternative points of intervention. It is believed that system dynamics has 
much to offer in evaluating interventions and policy alternatives that are intended to ameliorate 
the adverse outcomes associated with pharmaceutical opioids.  
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